Elizabeth I: Boethius (6 882 words)

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1

IX. PROSE.


2
3    "Hitherto hit sufficeth to shewe the forme of gileful felicitie,
4wiche if you Clirely beholde, the ordar than must be to
5shewe you the true." "Yea I se," quoth I, "that ynough
6suffiseth not riches, nor Power kingdomes, nor honor dignities,
7nor glory the prising, nor Joy the pleasure." "Hast thou
8gathered the cause of this?" "Methinkes I see hit as by a rife
9slendarly, but do desire plainliar of the to knowe hit."
10"Ready is the reason. Whan that wiche vnmixt and by nature
11vnparted is, that humaine error partz, and from the true and
12right to falz and wanting brings. Dost thou suppose that

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13nothing he wantes that powre needes?" "I think not so."
14"Truly thou hast sayde, for if ought be that is of weakist
15worth, must needly neede som others help." "So it is," said I.
16"Therfor the one & self same is nature of sufficiency & powre."
17"So it seemes." "But that ther is such thing, dost thou think
18it to be despised or wourthy all regarde?" "This is not to be
19doubted." "Let vs ad to this sufficiency, powre, reuerence,
20that these three we may Judge one." "Let it be, for trouth
21we wyll confesse." "Dost thou think this any obscure matter
22or ignoble, or of more show than any other dignitie? But consider
23lest it be graunted that that needes not, is most of
24powre, & worthyest most honour, yet wanting estimation,
25which to it self it can not giue, And therfore may seeme in som
26parte to be lesse wourth. We can not but graunte that this is
27most reuerenced. Then it followes, that we confesse a show
28of glory doth nothing differ from the other three." "Yt
29followes," quoth I. "Tham that that needes none other, that
30doth all of his own strength, that is beautifulst & most
31reuerenced: Is it not playne, that so is most pleasing to? I
32can not imagine, how to such a man any sorow can happen,
33wherfore necessarily it must be confest, that he is full of Joye,
34if the forenamed remayne. And by all this it needfully
35follows, that theffecte of sufficiency, powre, honour, Reuerence,
36plesure, be diuers names, in substance nothing differs. That
37that is then one & symple by nature, humayn synne dispersith;
38And in seeking to obtayne such thing as wantith
39partes, myndith the same to gett, And so nether gettes that
40portion that is none, nor that partie that desyres none." "How
41may this be so?" quoth I. "He that seekith riches by shunning
42penury, nothing carith for powre, he chosith rather to
43be meane & base, & withdrawes him from many naturall
44delytes, lest he lose the monny that he gat. But that waye,
45he hath not ynough, who leves to haue, & greeues in woe,
46whom neerenes ouerthrowes & obscurenes hydes. He that
47only desyres to be able, he throwes away riches, despisith

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48plesures, nought esteems honour nor glory that powre wantith.
49but how many thinges these men lackes, thou seest. Somtyme
50he lackes that necessary is, so as his want doth byte him, &
51whan he can not throwe of this, that most he sought,
52hability he wantes. Thus may we reason of honour, glory,
53& plesure. For if all these thinges weare ioynd togither,
54yf any one were had without the rest, he can not gett that
55he requires." "What then?" quoth I. "Yf any man all this
56can gett, shall he haue the greatest felicitie, shall he fynde her
57in these that we haue shewed you, promise more than they
58giue?" "Not so," quoth I. "In such thinges as ech man
59desyres to excell in, the true blesse is neuer to be found."
60"I confesse it," quoth I, "Than this nothing can be true."
61"Thou hast," quoth she, "heere a forme of false felicitie &
62the cause. Turn thy selfe now to the contrary syde of the
63mynde, for ther shal thou see strait way the true that I
64promysd." "This euin to a blinde man is playne," quoth I,
65"and to a litle afore thou showedst, In opening the faulse cause.
66For els I am deceaued, that is the true & parfet felicitie that
67makith man content, mighty, reuerenced, honord, & pleasant.
68And that thou mayst know, I haue inwardly lookt which of
69all these might trulyest all exceede. This I confesse to be true
70bliss, that is without a doubte." "O scholler myne, happy art
71thou for this opinion, yf thou wilt ad one thing withall."
72"Whats that?" quoth I. "Dost thou think that ought in
73mortall & fleeting thinges can make such a state?" "No,"
74quoth I, "That thou hast showde sufficiently, as nothing more
75doth neede. For these thinges as pictures of true good, seeme
76to giue som imperfet good to mortall men; but the true &
77perfet, bring they can not. Because thou knowest now, what
78be the true good, & what belyeth the true blisse, now it
79followith, that thou mayst knowe whence thou mayst ask the

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80true." "That is hit," quoth I, "I haue long lookt for. But
81as Plato in his Timee wills, that we should ask for divine
82help in meanest maters, what now thinkest thou to be don,
83wherby we may merite to fynde the seate of greatest good?"

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84

X. PROSE.


85
86    "For that now thou hast seene the forme of imperfett, &
87true good, Now I think to shewe the by what the perfection of
88this felicitie is made. In which first this I think to be
89inquyrd of, whither any such good ther be, as thou hast
90defynd a lyttle afore, among natures woorkes, leste a vayne
91imagination of thought deceaue us wyde from the truthe of
92that we talke of. And to proue it so, It can not be denyed

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93that this is the fountayne of all good thinges. For all that
94we call imperfett, is shewed such by the definition of perfection.
95So haps it, that if in any thing ther be imperfection,
96In the self same, somthing must needes be that can be perfett.
97For perfection taken away, we can not ymagyne what that is
98that is imperfect. For Nature tooke not her begynning of
99thinges diminished & worne, but of hole & absolute, &
100so cam downe into thes barren & uttermost partes. And
101if, as a little before I told you, there be imperfect felicitie of a
102frayle good, It can not be doubted but that ther is a solide
103& parfet one." "This is sure, and truly concluded." "But
104wher this dwellith," quoth she, "In this wise consider. The
105common conceite of mens myndes allowes, that God of all
106thinges the Ruler, is good hit self. For when nothing can
107be imagined better than himself, who can doute that that is
108the best, whom nothing can better? For so doth reason shew
109that God is good, that is won to confesse he is the perfect
110good. For without such he were, the Prince of all thinges he
111could not be: for so much the rather doth he possess perfection,
112that he was the first & aboue all: for the perfetest doo
113show them sellves first afore the lesser sorte. and lest our reason
114should neuer haue end, we must confesse that the greate God
115is indued with the wholle & perfett good. And we doo saye
116that true blisse consistes in perfection, we must then conclude,
117that true felicitie is in the greatest god." "I take it so,"
118quoth I, "nether can any thing gayne say it." "But, I pray
119the," quoth she, "Looke how proonest thou that most holyly &
120without spot, that we say God is the full perfection of greatest
121good?" "How shall I prooue this," said I? "Presume not to
122think that the father of all things haue taken this great good
123with which he is fulfilld eyther of outward cause or naturall,
124in ymagining a diuers substance of him that hath the obtaynid
125felicitie. For if from outward cause thou supposest
126he has taken, thou mightest than think that better, than he
127that gaue. But most worthely we confess that he excellith

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128all. Yf Nature haue done any thing in him, & in a diuers
129sorte, when we speake of God the guyder of all thinges, who
130can imagine to haue Joynd all these diuersities? Last of all,
131that that differs from any thing, that cannot be the same
132that is not hit. Wherfore that is contrary from the greatest
133good that can not be hit selfe, which were sacrilege to think
134of God, whom nothing can exceede. For nothing in Nature
135can be better than her begynning. Wherfore that was the first
136of all, in his own substance by a right argument I conclude the
137greatest good." "Rightly," quoth I. "But it is graunted that
138the greatest good is blesse." "So it is," quoth I. "Therfore,
139it needes must be graunted that God is blisse it selfe. Nether
140can the foresaid reasons fayle me, & by them I finde the consequence
141true." "See," quoth she, "whither this be not more
142truly prooued, for that twoo greatest goodes diuers in them
143selves can neuer be. Therfore goodes that differs, One can
144not be that the other is, for none of them can be perfect,
145whan in both there lackes. Then that that is not perfecte, is
146playne can not be the greatest good. By no meanes therfore
147can they be greatest good that be dyuers. Wherfore we
148gather that bliss & God be the greatest good, which makes
149that the greate Diuinity is the greatest bliss." "Nothing can
150be concluded," quoth I, "nor in it self more true, nor by
151reaason more stable, nor for god wourthyer." "In these causes,
152as Geometricians be wont to doo, demonstrations propounded,
153They bring in somthing which they call GREEK OMITTED . So will I
154give the somthing as a breefe gathering. For since men be
155blissed by getting of felicitie, & felicitie is Diuinitie, It concludes,
156that by getting of Diuinity men be blessed. For
157as Just men be made by getting Justice, & wyse men by
158wisdom, So men getting Diuinity, by lyke reason are made
159lykest to God. So euery blessed man, is in a kinde a God, but
160in nature one, in participation many may be. Most fayre
161& precious is this, which you call your GREEK OMITTED , or your
162Collection. And so much is it the fayrer, that naturall

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163reason it self perswades yow thus to ioyne them." "What of
164that?" said I. "When blissidnes conteynes many thinges in
165hit, whither be all the partes of this gatherd in one, as by
166varietie deuided, conioyned, or is ther som thing els, that fullfills
167the fulnes of bliss, & to this all the rest is referd." "I
168wold thes thinges were explaned," quoth I, "as by a memoriall."
169"Dost thou not think blisfulnes good?" "Yea the greatest,"
170quoth I. "This all will graunte. for it is the only sufficiency,
171the only powre, reuerence, beauty, delyte. What tho? all
172these good thinges, sufficiency, powre, all be but lyms of blissidnes.
173Be all thinges referd to good as to the Top?" "I know,"
174quoth I, "what thou propoundest to seeke, but what thou
175determynest, to heare I desyre." "Take this division of this
176sorte. Yf all these were partes of blisse, then should they differ
177in themsellves. For this is the nature of partes, that deuided
178they make a hole body, & all these thinges we haue shewed
179be one, Then they are not partes, or els bliss should seeme to
180be made of one parte, which can not be." "This doute I not,
181but that that remayns I attend. For to the greatest, all the
182rest of goodes must needes be referd. For therfore sufficiency
183is desyrd, that good it is supposd, & powre in like manner:
184so may we gesse of reuerence, honour, & delyte. For the
185somme of all desyred things is good. That neyther in hit
186self nor in his lyke retayns any blisse, that no man ought
187desyre. And contrary, those that by nature be not good, if
188they seme to be, as true good be desyrd. So is it, the greatest
189good, by right ought be beleeuid, the grownd work &
190cause of all desyred. The cause for which we wish ought,
191that most we desyre, as yf for helthes sake to ryde we
192desyre, we seeke not more the styrre of the exercise, than the
193good effecte of our helth. When than all thinges be desyrd
194for greatest good, we desyre not those thinges more than good
195it self. And that we graunt, that all thinges be desyrd to
196obtayne blisse, So we conclude she is only to be sought:
197wherby it playnly appeeres that one only is the substance of
198that is good & blisfull. I see no cause why any man

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199should doute heerof. And God we haue showed to be the
200only & alone good. So may we safely conclude that Godes
201substance is in that good & none other concluded."

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202

XI. PROSE.


203
204    "I graunt," quoth I: "for eche thing with strongest reason
205linked is." "How muche, woldz thou prise hit, if the tru

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206good thou couldst knowe." "At how infinite rate, for so
207shuld I obtaine to knowe what God wer." "And this with
208truest reason I wyl expres, if it be grauntid that afor was
209sayd." "Be it so." "Haue not we showed, that those
210thinges that be desyrd of many, therfore are not perfect &
211good, because they differ among themselves, So as where any
212want ther is of one thing to an other, than can no playne nor
213resolute good com? But then is good ther true, when they
214are gathered in one forme & performance, that what suffisith
215may haue powre, reverence, honour & delyte, for without all
216these be in one, a man hath nought that ought to be esteemd."
217"This is euident," quoth I, "& no man neede to doubte therof,
218for those that, when they disagree, be not good, when they
219are one, must needes be so." "But are not all these thinges
220made good by getting of a true vnity?" "Yes, sure," said I.
221"But all that is good, dost thou suppose it good thorow the
222participating of that is so?" "Yes." "Then needes it must
223be that that is only good that is euer one. for the substance is
224the same of ech man, whose effectes naturally they haue." "I
225can not deny it." "All that is so, long must last & holde
226togither, as it is one, but must needes perish & decay, whan
227so it leaves to be; as in beastes we see, when they ingender,
228& be made of lyfe & body, then it is a Creature. But
229when this vnitie makes a separation, then they are deuided,
230perish & decay. This body allso when hit remayns in one
231forme & joyntes of lyms, then humayn shape is seene. But
232if distract or partid in twoo they be, then they leave their
233vnitie which made them be. In that sorte, all the rest shall
234be playne to the sercher, that euery thing shall last while it
235is one, but when it leaves that order, it perishith. When I
236haue considered many thinges I find no other thing." "Ys
237ther," quoth I, "any thing that naturally, leaving desyre of
238lyfe, wischith to com to ruine & an end?" "In beastes themsellves
239that haue som kynde of will to fly or not, I fynde yf

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240men compell them not, they will not cast away their mynde of
241lasting, and hye them to the way of destruction. For ech
242best I finde studys safety to keepe, & shunnith death &
243decay. I can not tell what I may say of herbes, of trees, of
244rootes. I may doute, And yet ther is no greate cause, when
245we see the trees & herbes reviue agayn in their fittist
246place, that as much as nature will permitt, they may not
247soone dry & dye. Som in feldes, som on hills doo spring,
248others marish beare, others stick to stone, som prosper on
249barren sand, which if any man pluck vp to sett in other
250place, they wither. So Nature giues to ech that him becoms,
251& stryves that while they may remayne, they may not end.
252What shall I say? that som we see of them, as hauing turnd
253their top to earth, draw nourishment to the roote, & by
254their sap, spredes strength & bark? What, yea! that that
255is most soft, as were the marrow, is euer hyd in innermost
256rynde, without couerd by strength of som wood, but the vttermost
257bark against the heauens wether, as sufferer of harme,
258is set a defendour? Now how greate is Natures diligence,
259that all thinges be inlarged by most seede, which all, no
260man is ignorant, not only for a tyme of remayning perpetually
261stryues to remayn? Those thinges that only haue life,
262doo they not euer by a naturall instinct desyre their own?
263Why does lightnes draw vp the flame, & waight, the earth
264dounward drawes, but that all these agrees in their place &
265in their own motion? And that agrees that euer is conserued:
266as those thinges that discorde doth corrupte. Those thinges
267that of Nature be hard, as stones, they stick most fast to their
268own roote, & so resist as easely they be not pluckt of.
269The fleeting thinges as ayre & water, these easely be departed,

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270but quickly return from whence they were drawen.
271But fyre refusith all separation. We doo not talk now of the
272volontary motions of the soule of man, but of the naturall
273intent by nature given. As our meate we take without great
274study, & breth we drawe in our slomber when we know it
275not. For in very beastes, the desyre of contynuance, not of
276their lyves pleasure, but of their natures begyning procedith.
277For oft tymes our will imbracith death, cause compelling, which
278nature dreades, & contrarywise desyre of making our lyke,
279wherby contynuance doth endure, our wills som tymes keeps
280vs from that nature desyres. Wherfore this loue of our selfes
281proceedes not of a Creatures notion, but of a naturall intent.
282For Godes prouidence hath giuen to all thinges that be made
283the desyre of remayning, that as long they may, naturally they
284will byde. So needes thou neuer doute that such thinges as
285naturally desyre an abode will shun destruction." "I confesse
286it," quoth I, "for now I plainly see such thinges as doutfull I
287found, that couetes euer to be one, that couetes to remayn:"
288"& last this being taken awaye nothing can abyde. An vnity
289therfore all desyre. And one we haue showed that is only
290good. Since therfore ech thing seekith the good, it is playne,
291that is only the good that of all is desyred." "Nothing," quoth
292I, "can trulyer be thought. for eyther all thing shall com
293to nought, and as wanting a head, without a guide shall ruyne,
294or yf any thing ther be, to which all hastes, that shall be the
295somme of all best." "O scholler myne," quoth she, "I ioye
296that I haue fixd in thy minde one marke of meane to truth,
297and heerby mayst thou see a little before thou sayedst
298thou knewest not." "What is that?" quoth I. "What was
299of all thing the end. For that is it that of all men is most
300sought, wiche by caus we suppose only good is hit, therfore
301we confesse that to get is all owre end."

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302

IV. PROSE.


303
304    "I see," quoth I, "that vicious men haue no wrong, tho they
305be said by property of their mynde to beastes be transformd,
306tho in show they kepe the forme of humayn body. And yet I

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307wold not haue, that the cruell & wicked mynde should be
308sharpnid by the fall of good men." "Neyther is it," quoth
309she, "as in convenyent place I will showe. And yet if that
310were taken away from them that they are beleeued to haue,
311the wickedst payne should be in greatest parte releeuid. For
312that that may perchance seeme impossible, hit must needes be
313that wicked men be vnhappyer, when they haue fulfild their
314desyres, than if they could not get what they wish. For if a
315wretched thing it be to wysh that is nought, it is much more
316wretched to doo it. Whithout which the desyre of a wretched
317mynde wold fall. Wherfore when ech man hath his own
318misery, it must needes be, that by tryple misfortune, they be
319vexed, whom thou dost see haue a will to doo the worst." "I
320graunte it," quoth I, "And yet that quickly they might want
321this misfortune, I wish them depriued of possibilitie to doo mischeefe."
322"They shall want it," quoth she, "sooner perchaunce
323than eyther thou woldest, or they themselves think they may.
324For neyther is any thing so long in the short mesure of our
325lyfe, that an immortall mynde may suppose to tarry to long:
326whose greate hope & hye woork of mischefe oft is destroyde
327by an vnlookt for & souden end, which settes an end to
328their misery. For if iniquitie make men miserable, he must
329be more wicked that longer lastes: whom most vnhappy I
330should judge, if their last death might not end their woe.
331For if we conclude the truth, of wickednes misfortune, infinite
332must we suppose that misery that is euerlasting. Wonderfull
333thinges," quoth I, "is this declaration & hard to be graunted,
334but I know them to well agree to such thinges as before haue
335bene exprest." "Rightly dost thou think," quoth she: "and
336who so thinkes a hard conclusion is made, it were reson he
337should showe, that ther hath bene som falshod in the proposition,
338or that the tyeng of their argument bootith not for a
339necessary conclusion. Or els all the abouesaid graunted, ther is
340no cause to cauill in the subsequent. For this that I saye,
341not only seems not wonderfull, but, by such thinges as are
342alledged, most necessary." "What?" quoth I. "I saye that
343happyer be wicked men whan they suffer punishment, than

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344those whom no payne of Justice touchith? Nether mynd I
345now to speake of that every man thinkes, That wicked conditions
346being corrected by revenge & brought to the right way
347by terrour of their prison, to other men may serue for example
348to shun theyr faultes. But in other sorte I suppose the wicked
349vnhappy, tho ther were no cause of correction to make them
350vnpunished, nor no respecte of ensample." "What should this
351other way be?" "Haue we not said afore, that good men be
352lucky & euill men miserable?" "So it is." "Yf therfore som
353goodnes chaunce to misery, is it not much more happyer for
354him, than if his misery were alone by it self, without any
355goodnes mixture?" "So it seemes," quoth I. "But yf to that
356miserable man that wantes all good thinges, that euill be added
357to him to be alone, is he not much more to be accompted
358vnhappy, whose mysfortune is showed him thorow the participation
359of som good?" "What els?" "Therfore wicked men,
360when they are punisht, haue som good joyned with it, that is
361their punishment, which for Justice sake is in it self good.
362And they whan they want their correction, ther is som thing
363besides of euill, which is, want of punishment, which deserue
364ably thy self hast confest is the greatest yll Iniquitie can haue.
365More vnhappy therfore are wicked folkes, whan they want
366their punishment, than when they receaue their iust reward.
367For greatest iniquitie is committed, when Just men be vexed,
368& wicked slip from their reward." "Who can this denye?"
369"Wherfore, ech man must needes graunte, that all that is
370good, must needes be iust, & yll that is the contrary."
371"These be such thinges needes must follow the aboue concluded.
372But I pray the," quoth I, "shall there be no soules
373punishment after the dead body?" "Very greate," quoth she,
374"of which som be vsed by bitter paynes, other by a pacifieng
375Clemency. But now my mynde is a little of these thinges to
376dispute. For this hitherto we haue don, that thou mightest
377knowe the vnworthy powre of euill men is none at all. Euin
378such as thou complaynedst were voyde of punishment, that

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379thou mightest see they neuer want the payne of their wickednes,
380And that the liberty which thou wisshest should be
381ended, thou mightest learne not to be long, And so much
382more vnhappy, if longer, most vnlucky, yf eternall. And
383then I sayd that wicked folkes were more miserable, shunning
384their Just payne, than punisht with their right revenge.
385So follows it true with my opinion, That then they are
386greeuid with sorest punishmentes, whan they are supposd less
387plagued." "Whan I consider thy reasons," said I, "I can
388suppose nothing more true. But if I turne me to mans Judgement,
389who is he, to whom not only these thinges will not seeme
390to be beleeuid but scarcely to be herd?" "So it is," quoth
391she. "For they can not, that haue vsed their eyes to darknes,
392lyft them vp to the light of a cleere trowth, & lyke they
393be to such byrdes, whose sight the night dooth cleere, & day
394darkens. For while they beholde not the order of thinges,
395but their own affections, they suppose the liberty and lack of
396payne, for their faultes, the happiest. But now looke what
397the euerlasting light makith. Yf to best thou doo apply thy
398mynde, thou shalt neede no iudge to defer thy rewarde, Thou
399thy self hast ioyned the to the Excellency. Yf thou turn thy
400indeuors to worsse, beyond thy selfe seeke no revenger. Thou
401thy self to worst hast throwen the, & lookest to heauen
402& clayey earth by fittes, when all outward thinges fayles
403the, by thyne owne reason shalt perceaue, the difference
404between Sky & Claye. But the vulgar cares not for this.
405What tho? Shall we speake of such thinges now as shewes
406men most lyke beastes? What yf a man losing his sight hath
407forgotten that euer he had it, shall he suppose he lackes
408nothing of a mans perfection? Shall we suppose these men, tho
409they see, to be blynde? They will not leave so, But will with
410certain grownd of reson know, that they are more vnhappy
411that do wrong, than those that suffer it?" "I wold fayne know
412these reasons," said I. "Thou dost not deny, a wicked man is
413wourthy of all payne?" "I deny it not." "You think to, they
414are vnhappy that diuers wayes are wicked. Such as are
415worthy punishment, therfore no doute are miserable?" "It

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416agreeith well." "Yf therfore thou satest as a Judge, on whom
417woldst thou inflict the payne? eyther on him that made or
418suffred the wrong?" "I doute not but that I wold satisfy the
419sufferer by the punishment of the Actor." "Then wretcheder
420is the maker, than the Receauour." "It is reason." "For this
421& many other causes all hangyng on one roote, hit appeers that
422synne of his owne nature, makes men wretched, And that
423injury is not the receauers misery but the giuers. But Orators
424doo otherwise. They go about to mooue commiseration of the
425iudges for them that haue commytted som greate & cruell
426thing, when rather a juster commiseration ought to be had
427of such as be not brought by irefull accusers, but by such as
428themselves beemones & takes compassion of, as tho they
429wold bring the sick to the phisician, & cut of the disease
430by the false punishment. By which eyther the endeuour of
431the defendors should coole, or if it should proffitt them, must
432be turned into the forme of the accusation. But wicked men,
433yf they see any but a small clift wher vertue is to be seene,
434where wicked vice they may put of, by paynes cruelty, vnder
435coulour of recompensing vertue, will not call this cruelty, but
436will refuse their defendors labour, & giue themselves wholly
437to the accusers & Judges. So as wise men haue no place
438left them for hate. For who but a very foole will malice a
439good man? And who but he that lackes reson, will not hate
440the yll? For, as the bodyes sicknes, so is vice the myndes
441disease: euin as we suppose that sick men deserve not hate
442but commiseration, so ought they not be persecuted but
443pitied whose mynde than all sicknes bytterer, Iniquitie hath
444besieged."

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445

VI. PROSE.


446
447    "So it is," said I; "but since thy office it is to vnfold the
448cause of hidden maters, & expresse reasons hid vnder
449shade, I besech the, to looke on this, & for that this miracle
450doth most vexe me, teache it me." Then she, smyling a little:
451"You call me to a matter that all men chefely seek, to whom
452scacely suffisith to taste alone. For it is such a mater that
453one dout cut of, inumerable others as Hydras heades increase;
454nether euer will ther be an end, vnles a lyuely fyre of the
455mynde doo bynde it. For in this mater, we inquire of the
456purenes of Prouidence, of the succession of Chaunce, of
457hapning Luckes, of knowledge & predestination of God,
458& of our free will, which of how greate burden all these be,
459thy self canst waye. But because this is som portion of thy
460medecin to know these thinges, tho we be wrapt in a strayte
461lymite of tyme, yet we will stryue somwhat to determyne.
462For if thou delyte in a musicall song, thou must differ a little
463thy delyte, while I doo tune in order the Reasons knyt togither."
464"As please you," said I.

parameters for this division: #boethel_classification_1

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465    Then as begynning of an
466other theme, thus she disputed: "The creation of all thinges,
467& the disposing of mutable Natures, & what euer by any
468meane is mooued, getes the cause, order, & forme of Godes
469mynde, stabilitie. And this sett in the top of her Purenes,
470appoyntes a sondry manner for ech action: which order, when
471it is beheld in the very cleerenes of diuine vnderstanding, is
472named Prouidence . But when it is referd to those thinges
473that hit moouith & disposith, of the Auncientes it is called
474Desteny : which easely shall appeer to be divers, yf a mans

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475mynde will see the efficacy of both. For Prouidence is Godes
476pleasure, appoynted by him that all rulith & all diposith.
477But Desteny is the disposing of causes joynd to remoouing
478causes, by the which Prouidence knittith all thinges by her
479orders. For Prouidence includith all, whither they be diuers
480or infinite, but Desteny deuideth euery thing according to her
481motion, distributing it to place, to forme, & tyme: that this
482deuiding of temporall order joyned to the diuine pleasure may
483be made Prouidence, But that joyning, being seuerd &
484deuided into tymes, that is Fate. Which tho they be sondry,
485yet they depend one of an other. For fatall order proceedith
486of Prouidence purenes. For as a craftes man, conceauing in
487his mynde the forme of a woork, causith him to end, & that
488which he hath plainly & presently foreseene, he ordrith by
489tymes rule: so God by his Prouidence singularly & stable
490disposith all thinges to be don. But by desteny so devided,
491aboundantly & in his due season workes it. Whither Desteny be
492exercised by familiar Spirites that serues for Godes Providence,
493or whither the fatall work be knytt by the soule alone, or
494Nature seruing in parte therto, or celestiall courses of the
495heavens, or by Angelicall powers, or by sondry industry
496of Spirites, or by som of these, or by all: This is most
497playne, that the forme of all thinges vnmoueable & simple is
498Prouidence. But Desteny is of such thinges as the Diuine
499Cleerenes disposith to be don, & makith the mooving lynk
500& orderly Rule. So followes it, that all that subiect be to
501fate, be vnder Rule of Prouidence, vnder whom Fate it self
502down layes. But som thinges there are by Prouidence appoynted
503that doo exceede Fates force. Those thinges they be
504which fixed stably, next to diuinitie, exceede the Nature of
505Fates mutabilitie. For as of all Circles the inmost that turnes
506themselves about one rounde, coms neerest to the purenes of
507the midst, and as a steddy stay of all that rolles about, doth
508circuite the same, but the vttmost by wyder bredth rolled, the
509more hit goes from the vndeuided midst of the poynte, so much
510the more hit is spred by larger spaces, but whatsoeuer drawith
511neere & accompanith the midst, & with his purenes is

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512ruled, ceassith to be stopt or ouerrun: with lyke reason, that
513furdest goes from the first intent, is wrapt in straighter
514knotes of Fate. And so much the freer is any man from the
515same, as neerest he doth drawe to the orderers wheele. And
516yf he stick to the euerduring eternall mynde, wanting change,
517he goith aboue Destenyes necessitie. For as Reason is to
518vnderstanding, & that that is made, to that that is, And
519as tyme to Eternity, & Circle is to the middest poynte: So
520is the order of fate changeable, compared to the stable purenes
521of Prouidence. For desteny moouith heauen & skye,
522tempers the elementes among themselves, & turnes them
523thorow diuers changes: & such thinges as be bred & dye,
524renewes such by lyke generation of frutes & seedes. This
525knittes actions, fortunes of men by an indissoluble lynk
526of causes, which since they com all from the begynning of
527an vnchanging Prouidence, it must needes be that otherwise
528than so, they can not change. For so thinges be well ordred,
529yf the euerlasting purenes of Godes mynde doth prescribe an
530vnturning order of causes. But this Rule byndith in, thinges
531mutable & rashly fleeting, by his owne steddynes. Wherby
532altho to you that can not consider the order of thinges they
533seeme confuse, and rombled togither, yet he that is cause of all
534good, directes all thing to hit. For ther is no man how
535wicked soeuer, that for yll-sake, will doo ought so. Whom
536tho as I haue told you afore, in seeking good, an yll errour
537hath turnd, yet the order that coms from the roote of all good,
538turns no man from his begynning. But what, thou wilt saye,
539can be a greater confusion or a woorsse, than that aduersitie
540& prosperitie happens to good men, & alyke to euill
541doth hap, both wisht and hated? Doo men lyve of such
542integritie of mynde, that it must needes be that they be
543wicked or good, that be supposed so? For in this we see
544diuers judgementes of men vary, whom som thinkes worthy
545rewarde, other suppose deserue punishment. But let vs
546graunte that one man may discerne the good & yll men:
547Can he looke vpon the inward temper of the mynde, as well
548as of the body? The wonder is not vnlyke to him that

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549knowes not, why to men of wholle bodyes, somtymes to these
550sweet thinges please, som other delyte in sowre: why sick
551men som be helpt by lenitiues, som other cured by corrosiues.
552But this a phisician that knowes the meane of his helth &
553sicknes togither with his temper, nothing wonders at. What
554other thing is the myndes helth, than sincerity? What the
555sicknes, but vice? Who other is eyther keeper of good, or
556ouerthrower of yll, than the directour and phisician of our
557mynde, God himself? Who when he lookes out of the glasse
558of his hye prouidence, knowith what for ech man is best.
559And that he knowes is best, that he gyues him. And this is
560the greate miracle of destenyes order, when it is treated by a
561skyllfull person, at which the ignorant woonder. And that
562I may somwhat touche what mans Reason may comprehend
563of Godes depth, in that mater that thou supposest to be most
564just, & keeps greatest equalitie, it seemes all be different
565from him that knowith what Prouidence is. And as our
566frend Lucan sayde, the wynners cause pleased God, the woonne
567Cato. For in this world what so thou seest be done beyond
568hope, is the rightest order of all, And peruers is the confusion
569of opinion her self. But if a man haue so much manner,
570that he will agree both of diuine judgement & humayne,
571yet is he of his myndes strength so weake, as if any aduersitie
572hap him, he will leave to prise ynnocency, by whom he could
573not keepe fortune. For the wise giuer sparyth him whom he
574knowes aduersity will him payre, so as he will not suffer him
575labour in payne, for ought behooues him not. An other
576man ther is vniuersally vertuous, holy, & next to God.
577This man the diuine Prouidence judgith a wicked thing with
578aduersitie to afflict, so that he will not suffer him be vext
579with bodely disease. For as an excellenter than my self
580sayde: 'A good man, his vertues doo inhabite him.' So it
581concludes, that good men haue all thinges to rule, that
582abounding iniquitie might be ruyned. To other men he
583distributes certain mixtures, according to the qualitie of the

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584mynd. Som men he stingith lest they should ouerflow into
585greate felicity. Others he tosses with aduersitie, that he may
586establish their myndes vertue, by patience, vse, & exercyse.
587Others som to much feare, that beare they might; som other
588to much despise that carry they can not. These men he
589leades by woe to know themselves. Som other deserue an
590honorable name with price of glorious death. Som other haue
591shewed a sample to the rest, vnuincible of payne: And so doo
592shew to wicked men how vnwon vertue is. Which how rightly
593& in order & for their good to whom it hapt they haue bene
594don, ther is no doute. For euin that eyther sorowfull or
595desyred haps to the wicked folkes, proceedes of like cause.
596And as for the wicked, no man wonders, for thinking them
597worthy all yll: whose punishment both feares other from
598faultes, & breedes their amendement on whom it is imposd:
599Prosperous thinges serue for greate argument that they be
600good. But what ought men iudge of such felicitie? when they
601see them the servantes of the wicked. In which mater somtyme
602they seeme to haue dispensation, for that som mans
603nature is so headstrong & rash, that neede of necessities
604cause may make him fall into a mischeefe, whom the prouiding
605of monny got, might serue for remedy. But when he
606lookes, his fyled conscience with faulte, & with himself
607disputing of his fortune, perchance fearith that the losse should
608be sorowfull, of that the vse was delytefull. He will change
609therfore his condition, and whyle his luck feares to lose it, he
610will leave his wickednes. Vnworthy gotten felicitie throwes
611downe som men to deseruid ruine; som men haue leave to
612punish, that they might invre good men, & punish the yll.
613For as no league ther is between the wicked & good, so can
614not the euill among them selves agree. What els, when ech
615man disagrees, their vices being sondry, & often doo such
616thinges, which they discerne they ought not doo, after don
617they be? So haps it oft, that Godes providence wourkith a
618miracle, that euill men make yll men good. For when they
619see that they suffer harm themselves by euill men, abhorring
620such actors, retourne to vertues frute, while they study to be
621vnlyke such as they hate. For it is Godes only powre, to
622make of euill good, when vsing them as they ought, drawes

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623from them som effect of good. For order keeps ech thing,
624so as what so doth leave his assigned way of order, the self
625same tho it hap to an other, falles in rule, lest in Providences
626kingdom, Rashnes should prevayle. 'Hard for me it is these
627thinges that touche God, as all the rest, describe.' For
628neyther doth it becom man to comprehend all shapes of his
629woorkes, or by tongue or wit expresse. Only this may
630suffise, that we perceaue that God the maker of all Nature,
631disposith so of all as directes it to the good. And while he
632hyes to kepe such thinges in order as he made, he dryves all
633euill out of the boundes of his kingdom, by the order of a
634fatall necessitie. So it followes, that such thinges as we
635beleeue the Earth to haue plenty, if we looke vpon the
636direction of Providence, we shall see ther is no yll at all.
637But now I see the burdned with waight of question, &
638wearyed with length of reasoning, to expecte the sweetness of
639som verse. Take therfore a draught wherby refresht thou
640mayst trye strong furder to go."