Colville, George: Boethius (9 885 words)

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2

PHILOSOPHY.


3    Hetherto it suffyseth that I haue shewed the maner and
4forme, of false felicite or blessednes, which if thou beholdeste
5perfetlye, it restythe to declare from henceforthe, whyche is the
6very true felicitie.

7BOE:     Truelye I do se, that ryches cannot be satisfied with
8suffysaunce, nor power wyth kyngedomes, nor reuerence with
9dygnities, not glory with nobilitie or ge~tles, nor myrth with
10pleasures.
PHIL:     And hast thou perceyued the causes why it
11is so?
BO:     Certes me semeth that I see them as it were
12thorowe a thynne or narrowe chyn or clyfte, that is to saye: not
13very perfytlye, but I had leuer knowe them more apparauntly
14of the.
PHIL:     Truely the redye waye to knowe them is very
15perfytte. For that thinge, that by nature is symple plaine and
16inseperable, mans errour deuideth and separatith the same, and
17leadethe it from the true and perfyt good or felicitie, vnto false
18and vnperfyt good, and infelicitie. But thynkest thou thys, that
19a man hath nede of nothinge, that nedeth power?

20BOE:     I say nay.

21PH:     Trulye thou sayest well, for if there be anye thing that in
22any matter is of weke power, in that behalfe, it is nedefull
23that it wanteth and lacketh the helpe of som other.

24BOE:     I saye it is euen so.

25PHIL:     Therefore suffysaunce and power be both one and lyke
26by nature and kynde.

27BOE:     So it semethe.
PHIL:     And doest thou think that such
28thynges as suffisaunce, and power be, are to be dispysed, or

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29contrarye wyse, that they be most worthy reuerence aboue all
30thinges.
BOE:     I saye it is worthy reuerence and it may be no
31doute thereof.

32PHIL:     Let vs therefore conferre reuerence, to suffysaunce and
33power, that we may iudge these three thynges, all one thynge.
34
BOE:     Let vs adde them together as one thynge, yf we wyll
35confesse the truthe.
PHIL:     What thynkest thou than, dooste
36thou iudge that to be an obscure and ignoble thynge, that is
37suffyasunt, myghty and reuerend, or els right clere and excellent
38by al fame and renoune? And consider also whether that
39thinge, that hath nede of nothynge, that is moste myghtye, that
40is most worthy honor (as it is afore grau~ted) and hath nede yet
41of fame and renoune, whyche it cannot geue vnto it selfe,
42shoulde it seeme for that moore abiecte or lesse estemed of any
43parte?

44BOE:     I can not denye it, but I muste nedes confesse it, as it is
45in dede, ryght famous of renoune and noblenes.

46PHIL:     Then it is a consequence, that we confesse and graunt
47that glory and renoune nothynge differethe from the other three,
48that is to say, from ryches, suffysaunce and power.

49BOE:     I saye it foloweth.

50PHIL:     Than the thinge that hath no nede of any other, that
51canne do all thinges of his owne myght, that is clere noble and
52reuerend: do not this truely appere to be a thynge moste
53ioyfull.

54BOE:     I saye I cannot certaynelye tell or thynke from whence
55any sorow maye happen to any such thynge.

56PHIL:     Then it is nede that we muste graunt this thinge to be
57full of gladenes, if the foresayd thynges remayne true. And also
58we must nedes graunte that the names of suffisaunce, power,
59noblesse reuerence and gladnes, be dyuers and sondry thynges,
60but ther substaunce is all one, without any dyuersitie.

61BOE:     I saye it must nedes be euen so.

62PHIL:     Then the selfe same thynge that is all one and symple
63or pure of nature, and cannot be deuyded, the wyckednes of men
64deuydeth it, and when they labour to get part of a thyng that
65hath no partes, they nether gette anye porcion of the thynge,
66nor yet the selfe same thynge that they desyre.
BOE:     I saye
67after what maner do men deuyde the thynges.
PHI:     He that
68seketh ryches, to auoyde and defende pouertie, he laboureth not

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69to get power, but had leuer be accounted nedy vyle and pore,
70and also forgo and lose many naturall pleasures, then he wold
71lose the mony that he hath gotten. But by this meanes he that
72lacketh power, he that is greued, he that is vile or out cast, and
73he that is of noo fame or of no reputation, hath no suffysaunce.
74And truelye he that onely desyreth power, spendeth and
75wasteth riches, dispiseth pleasures and honoure wythoute power,
76and setteth not by glorye. But certes thou seyst that he wanteth
77many thynges, and yet happethe that he hath sometyme nede
78of thynges necessarye, and is bitten or greued wyth care and
79anguyshe. And when he cannot put awaye these thyngs, he
80cesseth and is not myghtye, whych is ye thing that he mooste
81cheyfely desyred. And lykewyse a man may reson and speake
82of honors, glorye, and pleasuers, as of power, and suffysaunce.
83For when euerye one of them is the selfe same, and lyke the other,
84whosoeuer seketh to get any one of them wtout the others, certes
85he hath not that he desyrethe.
BOE.     I saye what than, yf a
86man coueteth to gette all the~ to gether.
PHIL.     Certes I wolde
87say that he woulde get hym soueraigne felicitie and blessednes.
88But shoulde he fynde the same soueraygne felicitie, in thynges,
89that I haue shewed that cannot geue and performe that thing
90that they do promes?

91BOE:     I saye they cannot.

92PHIL:     Therefore blessednes or perfyt felicitie should be sought
93for, in noo wyse in the thynges that are thoughte to geue but one
94thing singulerly, of all thynges that are to be desyred.

95BO:     I saye I confesse the same and nothynge can be sayde
96more true then that.

97PHIL:     Therefore haste thou bothe the forme and the causes of
98false felicitie. Nowe turne the inwarde thoughte of thy mynde,
99vnto the contrary, for there thou shalt see anone the same true
100and perfyt felicitie and blessednes, that I haue promysed.

101B:      Truly I say this is very playne and euident, and it were
102to a blyndman, and thou dyddyst shew the same trewe and perfyt
103felicitie a lytell before, when thou dyddyste laboure to shewe
104me the causes of false felicitie. For (except I be deceyued)
105the same is the treue and perfyt felicitie or blessednes that
106perfourmeth in ma~ suffisance power, reuerence, noblesse, and
107gladnes. And that thou mayste knowe that I do perceyue the
108same inwardely I do confesse vndoutedlye that the same is the

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109full and perfyt felicitie or blessednes, that maye truely perfourme
110one of the sayd thynges, for by cause they all be one, and
111the selfe same thynge, and not dyuers thynges in substaunce, that
112is to say, suffysaunce, power, reuerence, noblesse, and ioye or
113gladnes.
PHYL:     O my chyld Boece I perceue thou art happye
114or blessed in thys opinion, yf thou wylte put thereto this, that
115I shal say.

116BOE:     I saye what is that.

117PHI:     Thynkest thou that there be anye thynge in these
118worldly and transitorye thynges yt may bring in or shew any
119such state.

120BOE:     I say I thinke not. For thou hast shewed that nothynge
121can be desyred, aboue perfytte felicitie.

122PHIL:     Therfore these worldlye thynges, that is to saye
123worldelye suffisaunce, power reuere~ce nobles and pleasures,
124semethe to geue vnto men the symylitudes or lykenes, of true
125good, or ells to geue certaine vnperfit and fained goodes: for
126truly they cannot geue the true and perfyt good.

127BOE:     I say I graunt the same.

128PHIL:     Now for bycause thou hast knowen whyche is the
129same verye true and perfytte felicitie, and whyche fayneth, or dissymulythe
130the same, that is to saye, that shewethe the false felicitie,
131then nowe it resteth that thou mayst knowe where thou
132mayste seke for this trewe felicitie.

133BOECIUS:     Certes that thynge I saye, I greately loked for nowe
134of late.
PHYLOSOPHY:     But forsomuch as it pleseth my scoler
135Plato, in his boke, named Thimeo, he saith that in the lest
136thynges of all, the helpe of God, ought to be required. What
137thynkest yu now to be done, that we maye deserue to fynde the
138sete or place of the same soueraygne good?

139

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140

PHILOSOPHY.


141    For by cause thou hast sene whiche is the forme of perfytte
142good, and whych also is the forme of imperfette good. Nowe I
143thynke it mete to declare wherein thys perfytte good or felicitie
144is set. In the which I do iudge to inquyre fyrste, whether anye
145suche perfit good (as the same that thou a litel before dyddyst
146defyne or determine) myght be in the nature of thyngs, that no
147vayne imaginacion or shadowe deceyue vs, and put vs out of the
148trewth of the thynge or matter, that we be aboute to talke of.
149And it cannot be denyed, but that there is parfytte good: And
150the same good is the fountayne of al good. For why? euery
151thyng that is called vnparfytte, the same is taken vnperfit by
152diminishing of ye thing that is perfytte. Whereby it commethe
153to passe, that yf (in any kynde of thynge) any thing is sene to
154be vnperfytte, therin, it is necessary that somthyng be also
155parfytte. For yf parfection be taken awaye, certes it cannot be
156imagyned from whence that thynge is, that is adiudged vnparfytte.
157For the nature of thynges toke neuer any begynnynge
158of thynges dymynished and vnparfitte but procedynge from
159hole and parfytte thynges, came downe or descended into these
160lower and baren thynges. And (as I haue shewed a litel before)
161if ther be any felicitie or blessednes vnperfyte vayne or frayle,
162it may not be doubted but that there is some felicitie and
163blessednes that is hole and perfyt.
BOE:     I saye it is fyrmely
164and truely concluded.
PHIL.     But consider after this maner,
165wherein perfytte felicitie dwellethe.
166    The common conceyte of mans minde do proue, that God is

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167the soueraygne and cheyfe good of al things. For whe~ nothyng
168maye be thought better then God, what man doutyth that
169thinge to be good when nothynge is better than it. Euen soo
170truelye, reason declareth that GOD is good, that it maye conclude
171also, that perfyt good is in him. For except it were soo, he
172canne not be prynce and soueraynge of all thynges. For somethyng
173hauing perfytte good, shoulde be better then he, and it
174shulde seme that that same thing were before and of more
175antiquitie or elder then God. For all thynges perfytte, are
176manyfest and do appere to be fyrst, before things that be
177vnperfyt. Wherefore, that my reason goeth not fourth infynytely,
178or wythoute ende, we muste graunte the hyghe God
179to be full of soueraygne and perfytte good. And we haue confyrmed
180and establyshed before, that perfit good is true felicitie
181or blessednes. Therfore it muste nedes be, that trewe felycitie,
182or blissednes: is set in the high God.
BOE:     I do graunt it, and
183it maye not be denyed by any meanes.

184PHYLO:     But I beseche the, se howe fyrmelye, and howe holy
185thou mayst proue, that we haue sayde, that the hyghe almyghty
186God, is full of soueraygne good.
BOE:     Howe should I proue it.
187
P:     Dost thou thinke that the father of al things hath taken
188from any outwarde thinge the same soueraygne good, whereof
189it is sayde he is ful, or els thynkest thou that he hath it
190naturallye of hymselfe? As thoughe thou shouldyst thinke that
191God hymselfe and the blessednes of God be of dyuers distyncte
192substaunce and not vnite all in one or of one onely substaunce?
193For yf thou thynkest that God hath receyued the sayde good
194outwardlye of any other, thou mayst iudge and esteme the same
195that gaue it hym, better and more excellent then he that
196receyueth it. But I do confesse that God is ryght worthylye
197mooste soueraygne and excellent of all thynges. And truely
198yf soueraygne good be in GOD by nature, but yet by reason
199dyueres, when we speke of God the soueraygne prynce of all
200thyng, let hym faine that can, who hath ioyned together these
201diuers thynges, that is to say, God and soueraygne good. Farthermore
202the thinge that differeth from euery thing, the same is not
203the verye same thynge, that it differeth from. So that the thing
204that diffreth from soueraygne good, is not by nature of it selfe,
205the same soueraygne good. But it were a wycked thynge or
206wronge so to thynke of that thinge, that is to say: of God, that

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207excelleth and passethe all other in goodnes. For alwayes the
208nature of nothynge maye be thought to be better then the
209begynnyng of the same thyng. Wherefore I shall conclude by
210good reason, that the thynge, that is, the begynning of all
211thynges is of hys owne substau~ce soueraygne good.

212BOE:     I saye it is wel concluded.

213PHIL:     But it is graunted before that soueraygne good, is perfytte
214felycitie and blessednes.
B:     I saye no lesse but it is euen soo.

215PHIL:     Therfor it behoueth to confesse that God is the same
216soueraygne good.
B:     I saye I can not auoyde, the resons
217before alledged. And I do perceyue that thys thyng shewed of
218them, is a very consequence to the thyngs.
PHIL:     Beholde now
219whether thys thynge maye be proued hereafter more firmely, that
220two soueraign good thynges that dyffer one from another, may
221not be. For it apperethe that the goodes that dyffer of them
222selfe, can not be all one thynge: Therefore nether of them canne
223be perfytte when that one of them hath nede of the other. But
224it is manyfest that the same, that is vnperfytte, is not soueraygne
225and perfytte. Therefore the goodes that be soueraygne, by no
226meanes may be dyuers or dyffer one from another. Soo then I
227have proued and gathered that both blessednes and God, be
228soueraigne good. Wherefore it behoueth that the soueraygne
229dyuinitie, is the same lyke thyng, as soueraygne blessednes
230or felicitie.
BOE:     I saye that by thys meanes nothyng may be
231concluded more true, nor more firme by reasoning, nor more
232worthy, then God.
PHI:     Therefore vpon these thynges, (as the
233Geometricians are wonte to brynge in thynges, that they call
234apparaunces after they haue shewed their propositions) eue~ so
235wyll I geue the as a correlary or conclusyon, for bycause that men
236be made blessed by obteyning of blessednes, and that blessednes
237is the same dyuinitie, it is manyfest yt men be made blessed by
238optaining of the diuinitie. And as men be made iuste by
239obtaynyng of Iustice, and wyse by obteynyng of wysedome: So
240by lyke reson it behoueth that men yt haue gotten diuinitie, be
241made gods. Then is euery blessyd man a God: But certes by
242nature, there is but one God, albeit by participacion of dyuynitie,
243no thyng letteth, or prohibyteth, but there be many Goddes.

244BOE:     I saye this is a gaye, and a precious thynge, whether
245thou woldest call it apparens, or a conclusion.
PH:     And certes

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246nothyng is fayrer, or more goodly then this thyng, that reason
247perswaded shulde be added to these forsayde thynges.
BOE:     I
248saye what thyng is it.
PHY:     When blyssednes semeth to contayne
249many thyngs, it is to doubte, whether all these thynges do
250ioyne togyther, as it were one body of blyssednes, by certayne
251diuersytie, or varyete of partes, or membres, or whether there be
252any one thynge, of them that of it self acco~plisheth the substaunce
253of blyssednes, vnto the whiche all the other be referred.
BOE:     
254I saye, I wolde thou woldest open the same vnto me, by example
255of the same thynges.
PHI:     Haue I not iudged that blissednes
256is good.
BOE:     I say we haue thought it souerayne good.
PHIL:     
257It behoueth that thou adde souerayne good to all these thinges
258that folowe. A FULL STOP ADDED For blissednes, is sufferayne suffysaunce, the same
259is soueraygne power, the same is soueraygne reuerence, the same is
260soueraigne clerenes, and the same is demed to be soueraygne
261pleasure.
BOE:     What then?
PHIL:     Be all these thynges, that
262is to saye: suffysaunce, power, and the other thynges, as it were
263membres of blissednes? or whether be they all referred vnto
264good, as vnto the chyefe of them.
BO:     I say, I perceiue well
265what thou preposyst to serch out, but I desyre to here what thou
266defynest or dost determyne.
PHY:     Vnderstande thou the solucion
267of the questyon thus. If all these thynges, were membres of blyssednes:
268then shoulde they dyffer one from another. For suche is
269the nature of partes, that dyuers partes or me~bres do make one
270bodye.
BOE:     Truely, all these thinges haue ben shewed before,
271to be all one thinge.
PHI:     Then be they no membres, or els
272it shoulde seme, that blyssednes were ioyned, or made al of one
273me~bre, which can not be.
BOE:     I say it is, no doute, but I loke
274for the resydue of thy question that remaineth.
P:     Truelye
275it is manyfest that all other things be referred vnto good. For
276therefore suffysaunce is requyred, by cause it is thought to be good.
277Therefore power, is desired, for it is thoughte also to be good.
278And lykewyse a man may coniecture of reuerence, noblesse, and
279plesure or delyghte. Then is soueraygne good the effecte and
280cause of all thynges that are to be desyred. For that thinge that
281hath no good in it self not symylytude or likenes of good, by no
282meanes ought to be desyred. And on the contrary wise those
283thynges also, that by nature be not good, yet yf they seeme to
284be as they were verye good, they be desyred: whereby it happethe
285that bountye or goodnes, is thought ryghtfully the verye

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286effecte and cause of all thynges to be desyred or loked for. For
287that thyng semeth cheyfly to be desyred or wished, for the cause
288or loue, wherof any thing is desyred. As yf a man would ryde
289for cause of helth, he desyreth not so much the mouing to ryde,
290as the effect of his helth. Therfore when that all thyngs be
291desyred, for the cause and loue of good, they be not desyred
292rather of al me~, the~ the same good. But we haue graunted that
293felicitie or blessednes is the thinge for the whyche all other
294thynges be desyred: wherefore onely felicitie or blessednes is
295sought for. Whereby it appereth clerely, that there is but one
296substaunce of the same good, and of blessednes or felicitie.

297BOE:     I se nothyng why any man may conte~de or say any thing
298to the contrarye

299PHIL:     But we haue shewed before that God and perfet blessednes
300or felicitie, is all one, and the selfe same thing.
BOE:     I
301say the same.
PHIL:     Therefore it is lawefull to conclude safelye
302and truelye, that the substaunce of God, is sette also in the same
303good, and not ells where, in any other thynge.

304

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305

BOECIUS.


306    I assent to all thy sayinges, for they all be knytt to gether with
307ryghte stronge reasons.

308PHIL:     Howe muche wylte thou esteme it, if thou knowest
309what thynge the sayde good is?

310BOE:     I wyll esteme it aboue all things if it so happen that I
311maye knowe also there withall, God that is good.
PHIL:     Certes
312I shall open the same by very good reason, so that the thynges,
313that be concluded a lytle before, do yet remayne in thy mynde.
314
BOECIUS:     I saye they shall remayne.
PH:     Haue I not shewed
315the that the same thinges that be desyred of many folke, that is
316to say: suffysaunce, reuerence, power, and such other be not
317true, and perfyt goodes, by cause they vary and dyffer one from
318another? and that when the one is without the other it may not
319brynge in suche good that is full and absolute, that is to saye,
320hauynge nede of nothyng? But we haue shewed before, that then
321it is trewe and perfyt good when that all the sayd thynges be
322gathered together, as into one forme, that is to saye into good,
323so that the same that is suffysaunce, is power, reuerence, noblesse,
324and delight. And truely except all the sayde thinges be one
325without diuersite, they haue nothynge in them whereby they
326shoulde be accountyd emongeste thynges that are to be desyred.
327
BOE:     I saye it is declared alredy, and no man maye doughte
328thereof.

329PHIL:     Then the thynges that do vary and dyffer, be no goodes.
330But when they haue begonne to be al one thynge then they be
331goodes. Do it not happen that these thynges be good by adoption
332or optaynyng of vnitie?

333BOE:     So I saye it semeth.
PHIL:     But al that is good, grauntest
334thou to be good perticipation or partakyng, or not?
BOE:     It
335is so.
PHIL:     Then thou muste nedes graunt by lyke reason, that
336one and good, be all one thynge. For there is but one substaunce
337of such thynges, whose effecte is not naturally dyuers.

338BOE:     I saye I cannot denye it.
P:     Hast thou not knowen
339the~ that euery thing that is, do so longe remayne and dwel
340together, as long as it is all one? And when it cessethe and is

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341not all one that then it dyeth and dyssolueth together?
BOE:     
342By what meanes?
PHILO:     As in beastes, when the soule or lyfe
343and the body, do ioyne together in one, and so remayn and dwel,
344it is called a beast. And when yt vnitie of them both is dissolued
345by separacion of the one from the other then it appereth that it
346dyeth and is no longer a beste. And lykewyse the body of
347mankynde, when it remayneth in one forme by coniunction or
348ioynynge together of the me~bers or lymmes, the fygure of man
349is sene, but yf the partes of the bodye (beynge distributed and
350seperated one from another) haue distroyed the vnitie, the body
351is not as it was before. And whosoeuer woulde serche other
352thynges, after the same maner it wyl appere, yt euery thyng wyl
353remayn in his proper substaunce whyle it is all one. And when
354it is no more all one, it dyeth.
B:     When I consyder wc my self
355many thynges, yet it semeth that it is none other thyng, then
356thou hast saide.
PHI:     Therfore is there any thyng, that (in
357as moche as it worketh naturally) leueth the appetyte and desyre
358of beynge, or of substaunce, and desyreth to come to death and
359corruption?
BO:     If I consyder the beastes that haue any nature
360to wyll or not to wyll: I fynde nothing (excepte it be compelled
361by outwarde vyolence) that forsaketh the intente or desyre to
362lyue, and hastyth of fre wyll to dye. For euery beaste labourethe
363to defende and kepe his lyfe and to eschew deathe and distruction.
364But I dought muche what I maye iudge of herbes, and
365trees, and of such things that haue no lyuynge soules, nor felynge
366at al as bestes haue.
PHIL:     Certes thereof thou mayst no dout,
367when thou lokeste on the hearbes and trees, howe they do growe,
368and flowryshe in places, conuenient for them, wher they cannot
369lightly wyther nor drye so longe as theyr nature may kepe them.
370For some of them do growe and sprynge in the feldes, other in
371the mountaynes, other in the marish, and other do cleue to the
372rockes or stones, some be grosse and plentyful some be lene and
373baren, whych would drye awaye yf a man go aboute to conuey
374the~ into any other places then such they be in al readie. For
375nature geueth to euerye thinge, that thynge that is conuenient,
376and laboureth to lyue and not to die, whiles they may haue
377strengthe to contynue. What shall I saye that they all do take
378there noryshynge from their rotes, as thoughe they had mouthes
379fastened in the earthe, and spredeth their nourishyng by the
380pyth, by the wod and by the barke? And what wylt thou saye:

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381that the softest thynge suche as the pyth of tre is, in the myddest,
382is defended wyth a certayne hardnes of the wode, and the barke
383is sette vttermoste of all, agaynst the intemperaunce of the ayer,
384as a defender to sustayne the hurt that may fal? And thus thou
385mayst see howe greate is the dyligence of nature, for al thinges
386be renued with multiplication of sede, whiche sedes who doth
387not know but that they be as certayne instrumentes not onelye to
388tary for a tyme, but also to remayne for euer, by generation or
389successyon. And also the thyngs that men do think haue no
390soules, do not euery of them desyre (by lyke reson) to kepe that
391is hys owne? wherfore els doth lightnes bere vpward the flames
392of the fyer, and grauitie or heuynes presse downe the erth but
393that the same places and mouings do best agre so, for euery of
394them. And farthermore euery thyng, kepethe that thynge, that
395is agreyng and according to it, ryght as the thynges that be
396contrarye, corrupteth and dystroyeth it.
397    Nowe truely the thynges that be hard as stones, do cleue so
398fast together, to theyr partes and defend them self, that they maye
399not be easylye deuided or broken a sonder. But veryly, the
400thynges that be soft and lyquyd, as the ayer and the water, do
401lyghtly geue place to any thyng that deuydeth them, but yet
402they do quyckely come together and ioygne vnto the partes,
403from the whyche they be deuyded. But the fyre wyll in noo
404wyse deuyded, but refuseth all dyuisyon. And I do not speke
405nowe of the voluntarye mouynges of the soule, that hath knowledge,
406but of the natural intencion of thynges, euen as it is that
407we do digest meates, that we haue eten without thynkyng thereon
408howe it is digested and as we do take wynde and breathe in slepe,
409not knowyng thereof. For certes, the loue in beastes to tary, or
410lyue, commeth not of the wyll of the soule, but of the begynnynges
411and instyncte workes of nature. For certes the wyll
412often tymes embraseth death, when that causes co~pelleth the
413same, whiche death nature feareth. And contrarywyse, other
414whyles the wyll compelleth vnto the thyng, that nature alwaies
415desireth, that is the worke of generacion, wherby onelye the
416contynuaunce of mortall thynges, endureth. And this loue or
417appetyte that euerye thynge hathe to it selfe, procedeth not, nor
418cometh of the mocion of the soule: but by naturall intencion.
419For the prouydence, or wysdom of God, hath giuen vnto thynges
420that he hath creat this, that is to saye: a great cause to contynewe

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421styll, in as moche as they desyre naturally to lyue as longe
422as they may. Wherfore there is nothynge that thou nedest to
423doubte in any maner, for all thynges that be: desyreth naturally
424stedfast dwellyngs, and to eschewe distruction.
BOE:     I confesse
425that I do se nowe without any doubte, the thynges that of late,
426semed vncertayne vnto me.
PHY:     Certes, the thynge that desyreth
427to be and remayne alwaies, desyreth to be one and not
428dyuers. For yf that one, were taken away and dystroyed: certes
429there shulde remayne no beynge to any thynge.

430BOECIUS:     I saye, it is trewe.
PHI:     Therfore al thinges
431desyreth one.
BOE:     I haue graunted.

432PHY:     Then I haue shewed that the same one thinge, is the
433thing that is good.
BO:     Ye truly.

434PHY:     Then all thynges desyreth good, and that thou mayst
435descrybe and decerne thus, the same good is the thinge that is
436desyred of all men.

437BOE:     I saye nothyng maye be thought more true, for either al
438thyngs be brought to nothing and do wander withoute a gouernour
439ofor gyde destitute and spoyled of one, as of their head and
440beginning, or if there be any thinge wherevnto all thynges,
441draweth, that thynge is the soueraign of al goodes.

442PHI:     O my norished child I am glad of the, for thou hast
443fastened in thy mynde, and thought, the verye marke of perfette
444truthe, but in thys it appereth to the that thou saydist a lytel
445before that thou diddest not knowe, or were ignorant.

446BOE:     What is it?
PHIL:     Certes thou saidest thou wist not
447what was the ende of all thinges: surely the same ende is the
448thyng that is desired of all men.
449    And forasmuch as we haue gathered that good is the thynge
450that is desired of all, it behoueth that we confesse and agree that
451good is the ende of all thinges.

452

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453

BOECIUS.


454    Then I saye, I graunt that thou haste sayde. And I perceyue
455that wycked folke may be sayde ryght well to be chau~ged into
456beastes, by ye qualitie of their mind or thought, although they
457kepe the forme of mans body. But I wolde not that it were leful
458for them to do the wickednes or bestly thoughtes, whose
459mynde being cruell and wicked, waxeth wode in destruction of
460good folk.
P:     Certes it is not lawefull for them, as it shalbe
461shewed in place conueniente. But yet if the selfe same thynge
462(that is thoughte to be lawefull for wycked folke, to do) be taken
463away from them, soo that they myght not hurte good folke
464a grete part of the payne of the wiked folke, shoulde then be
465reuealed and shewed. For it semeth perchaunce incredible
466to some folke, that it behoueth that wycked folke be more
467vnhappye when they haue accomplyshed ther desyres, then

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468if they myght not performe and do the same, that they desyre.
469For if it be a wretched thyng to wyll to do euyll thynges, It is a
470more wretched thyng to haue myght to do it, without whych
471myght theffect and dede of the wicked will, should fayle.
472    And nowe synce that euery of the sayde thynges, that is to say
473wyll, myght, and effect, hath his own mysery, it behoueth that the
474wycked (whome thou seyst to wyl and may do wyckednes)
475be greued wc three folde myscheyfe.

476BOECI:     I saye I graunt the same, but I herteley desyre that
477the wycked folke (forsakynge the power to do euyll) maye sone
478lacke the sayde thre folde myschyfe.
P:     So shall they want
479peraduenture sooner then eyther thou wouldeste be sorye they
480shoulde, or that they themselfe wene, that they shall wante. For
481there is nothyng so durable in so shorte bonds of this lyfe, that
482the myndes (specially immortal) do thynke longe to abyde and
483endure. Of whyche foresayde wycked the gret hope and the gret
484compassing power of wyckednes, is oft distroyed with sodayne
485ende, and er they beware thereof: which foresayde sodden
486destructyon, truelye hathe appoynted them an ende of theyr
487wretchednes.
488    For yf wyckednes makethe wycked folke then must he nedes
489be most wycked that longest is wycked. Whyche foresayde
490wycked folke I would iudge most vnhappye or caytyfe, if that
491extreme death at lest waye dyd not finish their wyckednes.
492    For if I haue truely concluded of the myschyfe of the wycked
493folke, then it apperethe that their wyckednes is withoute ende
494whyche appereth to be eternall or euer contynuyng.
BOE:     I
495saye this is a merueylous and a hard conclusion, to graunt: but
496I do knowe that the same doo wel agre to the thynges that were
497graunted before.
PHIL:     Thou iudgest well in this, but he that
498thynkethe it a harde thynge to agre to the conclusion, it behoueth
499hym to shew eyther that some false thynge hath gone before, or
500ells he must shewe that the conferrynge of proposions is not
501effectuall or maketh no force of a necessary conclusion, Or els
502yf he graunt the thinges precedent there is no cause at all, whye
503that he should complayne vpon the argument. For thys thynge
504that I shall say now shall no lesse seme maruaylous, but is soo
505necessarye to be concluded, of the thinges that be concluded before.

506BOE:     I saye, tell me what is it?

507PHIL:     Certes the sayd wycked folke be more happye and

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508blessed that be ponyshed for their desertes, then yf no ponyshment
509of right do chastyce them at all. And I do not intend thys
510now, for that any man myght thynke that the wycked maners of
511men be corrected by ponishment, and that they be brought to the
512ryght waye for feare of ponishment, nor for that their payne and
513ponyshment shoulde be an example to others, to eschewe vyce
514and wyckednes, but I doo iudge that the wycked folke that be
515iustlye ponyshed be more blessed after another maner, the~ for ye
516sayd .ii. causes though no maner of correctyon nor respect of
517example be had.

518BOE:     I saye what shalbe that maner besydes the sayd other.
519
PHIL:     Haue we not graunted that good men be happy and
520blessed, and euyll folke wretched.
BOE.     I say it is so.
PHIL:     
521Then yf anye good be added or put to the wretchednes of any
522man, is not he more happy then the man, whose myserye is pure
523withoute myxture of anye good wyth such mysery or wretchednes.
524
B.     I say it semeth so as thou sayest.
PH.     What if some other
525euyll (besydes the euyl he hath alredi) were annexed vnto yt
526same wretche that wanteth al good, sholde he not be demed
527more wycked then he a great deale whose euyll is tempered and
528mytigated with ye distribution or partakyng of suche good.
529
BOE:     I saye what ells.
PHIL.     Then certes the wicked folke
530when they be ponished, haue some good annexed, That is to
531saye: theyr payne and ponishement that they suffer, whych is
532good, by reason of iustyce. And there is in the same wicked
533folke (when they be vnponyshed) some other euyll, that is to
534saye: the lacke of ponyshment, whyche lacke of ponyshme~t (for
535desert of wickednes) thou hast graunted to be euyll.
BOE:     I
536cannot denye it.
PHIL:     Then such wycked folk be more wycked
537when they be wrongfullye perdoned and delyuered from ponyshment,
538then when they be ponyshed by iust iudgement. And so
539it is manyfest that it is ryght to ponyshe wycked folke, and
540that it is a wicked thing to let them escape vnponyshed.

541BOE:     Who wyll denye the same.

542PHIL:     Certes no man can deni al thing to be good, that is
543iust and ryghte, and on the other syde the thyng that is vniust
544and false, appereth to be euyll.
BOE.     I say Certes, that these
545thinges be consequences, to the thyngs that be concluded a
546lytell before. But I praye the tell me, dost thou thynke that any
547ponyshment is lefte for the soule after that the body is dede?

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548PHIL.     Ye truelye and that very great ponishment, of the whyche
549soules I thynke that some be tormented with intollerable payne,
550and other be ponyshed by the meke paines of purgatorye, but I
551am not now mynded to speke of suche thynges. But I haue
552spoken hytherto that thou myghtest know, yt the myght and
553power of wycked folke (that semed to the most vnworthy) is no
554myght nor power. And that the wycked folke that yu complaynest
555vpon that they were vnpunyshed, thou sawest dyd
556neuer wa~t due ponyshment for their wyckednes. And thou
557dyddest praye that the power and myght, in malyce that the
558wicked folke had agaynst the good folke, shortlye to be ended.
559And that thou myghtest perceyue that it is not long, and that
560ye myght of the wycked were more vnhappye yf it were continuall
561or longe enduryng, and that it is most vnhappye if it
562were perdurable, and should neuer cese. And furthermore it
563is proued that the wycked folke that be let go without iust
564ponyshment, be more wycked then when they be ponyshed by
565iust iudgemente. And to thys sentence it is a consequence, that
566then at the last the wycked folke be turmented with more
567greuous ponyshments, when they seme to be vnponyshed.
568
BOE.     When that I do consyder thy resones (I say) I do thinke
569that nothing is sayde moore true. But if I tourne agayne to
570the iudgementes of the comen people, what man is there that
571not onely semed to haue beleuyd these thynges, but at lest way
572to haue hard these thynges?
PHI.     It is euen so. For the
573commen people cannot lift vp their eyes (that be vsed to
574darkenes) vnto ye light of the very truth, but they be like vnto
575birdes whose sight the night doth lyghten and the daye doth
576blynde. For whyles the commen people do not beholde the
577order of thynges, but theyr own affectes and desyres, they do
578iuge that eyther the power of the wycked agaynst good folke,
579or their escapyng from ponyshment is happy and blessed. But
580se what Goddes lawe apopynteth. If thou conforme thy mynde
581to the beste thynges, thou hast nede of no iuge that shal rewarde
582the, for thou hast applyed thy selfe to the most excellent and
583beste thynges. But if thou hast turnyd thy mynde vnto euyll
584thinges, as vnto vyce, seke not anye outewarde ponysher without
585thy selfe, for thou hast cast thy selfe into the worste thynges.
586Like as if thou shouldest loke vpon the foule erth and heuen in
587order (all outwarde thynges leyde apart for the tyme) then it

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588should seme to the by reson of lokyng, that thou were now
589present in the sterres and now in the foule earthe. But the
590commen people beholde not these thynges. What than, shall
591we ioyne vnto these comen people whych (I haue shewed) be
592like vnto beastes? What woldest thou say yf that a man had
593vtterly lost his sight and also hadde forgotten that euer he sawe,
594and yet dyd thynke that he lacked nothing of the perfection of
595a man would not we that saw the same iuge that he were blynde.
596For the common people woulde not beleue the thynge that I
597shall saye, whyche is sustayned by as strong groundes of reason,
598that is, that they that do wronges be more wretched the~ they
599that suffer wrong.
BOE.     I saye I wold fayne heare these
600reasones.
PHIL.     Wilt thou denye that all wycked folk be not
601worthy ponishment.
BOETI.     No.
PH.     Truely it appereth
602diuers wayes that they that be euyll be wycked.
BOE.     I saye
603it is euen so.
PHI.     Then thou doughtest not that they that be
604worthye ponyshmente be wretches.
BOE.     I saye it behoueth
605so.
PHIL.     If thou that satiste as a iudge, whether wouldest
606thou thynke hym worthy ponyshement that hathe done wrong,
607or he that hath suffered wro~g?
BOE.     I saye I woulde no doute
608but I would satisfye and contente hym that hath suffered wronge
609with the ponysment of hym that dyd the wrong.
PHI.     Then
610it semethe the, that he that doth wrong is more wretche then he
611that taketh wronge.
BOE.     I saye it foloweth well.
PHI.     Therefore
612for thys cause and for other lyke causes of the same sorte,
613it appeareth that syns of it self, by nature maketh men wretches.
614And it semeth to euerye man that the wronge that is done, is
615not the wretchednes of hym that taketh the wrong but of hym
616that doeth the wrong.
BOE.     Certes the orators do contrarye
617for they so labour to moue the iudge, to haue pitie vpon the~,
618that haue done some haynous and greuous offence, where as
619more pytie ought to be shewed vnto them that haue suffred
620wrong and it behoueth that they yt haue done such offences
621should be broughte (not with angre, but rather with merciful
622accusers) vnto iudgemente, as sycke folke be broughte vnto the
623physicion, that the iudge myght put awaye the syckenes, of the
624offence, with ponyshment, by whych meanes the dyligence of
625the orators should either holye cesse, or els if they would profyte
626offenders, their diligence shoulde be turned into the habyte of
627accusation, that is to say they shoulde rather accuse offenders,

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628then excuse them or intreate for them. And so the offenders
629(if it were lawefull for them to se by any chyn or clifte the
630vertue and goodnes that they haue loste, and that they shoulde
631expulse the vylenes of theyr synnes, by torme~tes of paynes, to
632optayne some recompence of theyr goodnes) woulde not esteme
633thys for ponyshments, but wold forsake the diligence of suche
634orators and defenders, and commyt them selfe holy to the accusars
635and to the iudges. Whereby it happeth that hatred hath no
636place emongeste wise me~. For who hateth good folk but he be
637a very fole? And he hath no wyt that hateth wicked folke.
638For lyke as syckenes is the dyssease of the bodye, euen so vyce
639and synne is as the syckenes of the mynde, or soule. And when
640we doo iudge that men that be sycke in their bodyes, be not
641worthy to be hated but rather worthy to be pytied, eue~ so much
642the more are they not to be hated, but to be pitied whose
643myndes wickednes greaueth, that is more fierse and cruell, than
644any syckenes of the body.

645

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646

BOECIUS.


647    I saye it is euen so. But forasmuch as it is in thy goodnes to
648declare vnto me the hyd, and secrete causes of thynges, and to
649shewe me the darke reasones thereof, I pray the that thou
650wouldest dispute and iudg of the same secrete causes, for this
651wonder or meruayle troubleth me gretely.
P.     Then philosophye
652smylynge a lytle thereat, sayd: thou requyrest me to
653shewe the, the greteste thinge of all thynges that maye be
654requyred, wherevnto scarse any thinge is left sufficiente to resolue
655the same. For the matter that thou askest is such, that one
656dought beyng determyned, other doughtes innumerable do ryse
657vp thereof, as the heades of the serpent Hidra: And there
658shoulde be no ende of the same doubtes, except a man kept in,
659the same doutes wyth the quicke fyer, or serche of the wytte.
660For in thys matter men be wont to inquyre of the symplicitie or
661puritie, of gods ordinaunce, of the order of destinye, of sodayne
662chaunces of fortune, of the diuine knowledge and predestinacion,
663and of the libertie of fre wyll. All whyche thynges, of howe
664greate wayte and difficultye they be of, for to determyne, thou
665thy selfe doeste verye well perseyue. But forasmuch as it is

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666parte of thy medicine, for the to know these thynges, although I
667haue lytle leysure to do it, yet I wyl endeuor my selfe to declare
668somwhat thereof. But if the swetenes of the versys or metyr of
669musycke, do delyght the any thynge at all, thou must defer and
670put of a lytle that delyght, vntyll I shall forme certayne reasones
671ioyned in order, together for that purpose.
BOE:     I say do what
672it please the.

parameters for this division: #boethco_classification_1

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673PHIL.     Then spake phylosophy thus as one that
674began to speake by another principle. The generacion of all
675thynges, and the procedynges of natures mutabilitie, and all
676other thynge that moueth now taketh their causes, order,
677and fourme by the stedfastnes of gods wyll and pleasure. And
678the same, that is to saye: goddes wyll and plesure, beyng
679set fast in the towre, or profounde altitude of hys simplicitie or
680puritie, hath appoynted many maners or wayes, for thynges to
681be done: whych wayes or maners, when they be conceyued in the
682puritie of the dyuyne intelligence, it is named prouidence or
683ordynaunce. But when the sayde maner or wayes is referred by
684men vnto the thynge that mouethe and disposeth, it is called of
685olde folke, destinye. Whyche thynges, that is to say, prouidence
686and destenie, shal easely appere to be contrary thynges, yf a man
687wyll well consyder in hys mynde the strength of them both. For
688prouydence is the same deuyne or godly reason that is established
689in the soueraine hygh prynce of al thynges, which godly reso~ diiposeth
690and apointeth al things. But destinie is a disposicion,
691cleuyng vnto mutable or temporal thinges, by which dispositio~,
692prouide~ce knitteth al thinges in order. For prouide~ce embrasethe
693all thynges together in one, although they be dyuers and infinite.
694But destynye deuydeth all thynges being distributed in mouing,
695places, formes, and tymes, as thus. Thys explycacion or declaracion
696of temporall order, that appertayneth vnto destynye, being
697vnite or knytte together, in the syght of gods thought, is called
698prouydence or ordynaunce. But the vniting of such ordynaunce
699temporall, beynge deuyded and shewed in successyon of tymes,
700may be called destinie. Which destinie and prouydence,
701althoughe they be dyuers, yet the one of them dependeth vpon
702the other. For the order of destinie procedeth and commethe of
703the simplicitie or puritie of gods prouidence. For lyke as a
704workeman conceyuing in his mynde the forme or fashyon of the
705thyng that he is about to make, moueth and goeth aboute
706theffecte of his worke, and ledeth by temporal or bodily ordynaunces

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707the thing that he had conceyued symply and presently
708in his thought, euen so certainelye god by his prouidence or
709ordinau~ce disposeth and ordrythe singulerly and fyrmely al
710thynges that be to be done. But he mynystreth dyuersly and
711temporally the same thynges by destynye that he hath disposed
712or appoynted to be done. Then whether that destynye be exercised
713by certaine godly spyryts, attendyng vpon gods prouidence,
714or by the soule, or by nature, holye seruyng god, or by the celestiall
715mouinge or constellacion of sterres, or by the vertue of
716Aungels, or by the dyuers craftes and soteltyes of deuylles, or by
717anye of them, or by them all, the order of destinie is accomplyshed
718and done. Certes it is manyfest that gods prouidence
719is a stedefast and symple or pure forme or maner, of thynges to
720be done.
721    But destinye, is a mutable disposition and temporall order of
722the things that gods simplicitie or puritie hath appointed or
723suffered to be done. Whereby it happeth that all thynges that
724be vnder or subiect to destinie be also subiect and vnder gods
725prouidence and ordynaunce. To the whyche prouidence or ordynaunce
726destinye is subiecte it selfe. But some thynges that be
727subiecte and put vnder godes prouidence, and ordynaunces, doo
728excell and passe the order of destinye. Truely the thinges that
729be fixed and knyt faste nyghe to the godhed, do excell the order
730of mouable destynie, for as circles or wheles that do turne them
731selfe about one self centyr or poynte, the innermost circle next
732vnto the centyr or poynt, cometh and ioyneth next of al vnto
733that which is a lone in the myddell, and is as it were a certayne
734centyr or pointe to the other circles or wheles, that be set and
735placyd aboute, and be turned without the centre or poynt. And
736the vttermost cyrcle that is turned wyth a greater compasse,
737is set fourth with so muche more large spaces as it is distant by
738diuision from the myddle of the centyr, or poynte. But yf there
739be any thinge that knyttethe and vnytethe it selfe, to the same
740myddell centyr, or poynte, it is driuen into simplicitie, that is to
741sai: into a thinge pure and alone of it self, constant and immouable,
742and ceasseth to be seperate or to go at libertye. And
743so by lyke reason the thynge that departeth or goeth awaye
744ferthest from the fyrst thought of God, is wrapped with greater
745bandes of destynye. And soo much more is any thyng fre from
746distinye, as it is nere the same centyr, or poynte of thynges, that

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747is to saye nere vnto god. And yf the thynge doo cleue firmely
748to the hygh thought of GOD without mouing, truely it passeth
749the necessitie and power, of destinie.
750    Therefore like comparison or diuersitie as is betwene reasonynge,
751and vnderstandynge, and betwene the thinge engendred
752and the thynge that is, and betwene tyme and eternitie, and
753betwene the circle, and the middle centyr or poynt, euen so is the
754mouable order of destinye vnto the stedefast simplicitie or puritie,
755or gods prouidence and ordynaunce. The same order of destenye
756moueth heuen and the sterres, and tempereth the elementes together
757emongest them self and chau~geth them by enterchaungeable
758mutacions. And the same order of destinye renueth all
759thynges, growinge, springing and fallyng by lyke progressions of
760frutes and of sedes, that is to saye, of all beastes and growing
761thinges.
762    And thys order of destenye kepethe in and constraineth from
763liberty al mens actes and fortunes by a band of causes that can
764not be vndone or losed, which causes when they do procede from
765the immouable begynnynges of gods prouidence and ordynaunces,
766it behoueth that they be immutable. And so al thinges be well
767gouerned, as longe as the simplicitie or the onelye stedefastenes
768abydyng in the dyuine thought, sheweth fourth the immouable
769order of causes. And truly this order of the deuine prouidence,
770kepeth in, by his stedefastnes, thynges mutable of them selfe, and
771that otherwyse wold passe awaye casually and rasshely, if that
772restrayned not: wherby it happeth that although al thyngs seme
773confuse, darke, and troublesome to you that be not able to consyder
774thys order of thinges: the proper maner of gods prouidence
775directynge it selfe to good, disposeth and ordereth all thyngs. For
776there is nothyng done for the entente orof euil, not so muche of the
777same wicked folke. Which wicked folke (as it is shewed aboundauntlye
778before) do seke for good, but that wycked errour do
779peruert, and turne them from it, and not the order that cometh from
780the bosome of the high soueraign good, that is god, do turne anye
781man from his begynnynge, that is to saye from god. Certes what
782confusion may be more wycked, the~ that other whiles aduersitie and
783other whiles prosperite do happen vnto good folke, and also to
784wycked folke sometyme what they desyre, and sometyme the
785thynges that they hate and abhorre. Do men now liue in such perfection
786of mynde that suche folk as they do iudge to be good or euil

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787must nedes be suche as they doo iudge them? But mens iudgementes
788in this thynge do varye and not accorde. For the same
789folke that some me~ do esteme worthy reward, other agayne do
790deme to be worthy of ponyshmente. But let vs graunt that some
791ma~ may discerne and knowe the good or the euyl folke, maye he
792than know and se the inward condicion of mans thoughte as it hath
793bene wont to be sayd of the bodyes? That is to saye: maye a
794man knowe a mans thought, as men may knowe the complexion
795or outward condicio~s of the bodye? Certes is not this lyke a
796myracle vnto a man that knowethe not, whye that swete thynges
797agree well to hole folke, and bytter thinges to sycke folk? Also
798why some sycke folk be heled with gentle medicines, and other
799sick folke with sharp medicines. But the phisicion that knoweth
800bothe the maner and temperaunce of helthe and syckenes,
801meruayleth not therat. But what other thynge semethe to be
802the helth of mens mindes and thoughts, but onely vertue? and
803what other thynge semeth ye sicknes of mens myndes and
804thoughtes, then vyce and syns. Who els is the keper of good
805folk, and expulser or suppresser of wickyd folke, but only god
806the ruler and the healer of mennes soules, whych god, when he
807beholdeth and loketh downe from the high towre of his prouidence,
808he knowethe what is conueniente and meete for euerye man, and
809geueth to euerye manne the thing that he knoweth is mete for
810him. Nowe hereof commethe thys notable myracle of the order
811of destinie, when that god (that knoweth all thynges) doeth the
812thynge that the ignoraunte people do wonder at. For to speake
813a fewe thynges of the profounde depenes of the godhed that
814mans resonne, may attayne vnto, the same man that thou demyst
815iust and kepyng equitye, and ryght, semeth contrarye to Gods
816prouidence that knoweth all thynges. And certes my familier
817felowe Lucan declareth, that the cause victorius, plesyth the gods,
818and the cause that is ouercome pleaseth Plato. Therefore what
819soeuer thinge thou seist donne here in this world contrary to the
820knowledge and expectacion of the ignoraunt folk, it is the ryght
821order of thynges, but to thy iudgement, it is a peruers confusion
822of thynges. But admyt that some man is so well learned or
823instructed, yt both gods iugement, and ma~s iugement do agre in
824him together as one, but yet yt he is weke minded or harted, that
825yf any aduersitie by chaunce happen vnto hym he wilbe clene
826turnyd from his vertue or innocensye, wherby he may not kepe

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827his fortune, then the wise dispensacion or prouidence of God
828spareth hym, whome aduersitie and trybulacion myghte empayre
829and make worse. And god wyll not suffer him to laboure that
830is not mete or able to laboure. Another man is absolute perfit
831in al vertues, holy and nere vnto god, so that gods prouidence
832woulde deme it wronge yt he shulde be touched with any aduersitie,
833in so much that he will not suffer him to be vexed wc any
834infyrmitie or sycknes of the body. For as a certayne phylosopher
835(more excellente by me) hath sayde: certes a true preistly man
836laboreth not, for vertues haue preserued the body of an holy ma~
837from aduersitie. And often tymes it happith that the cheyf
838thynges yt be to be done, be geuen vnto good folke, that the
839wyckednes aboundyng in euyl folke, shold be oppressid. And
840god dystributeth and geueth to some folke nowe good, nowe euyll
841thinges, accordyng to the qualitie of theyr mind. And some good
842folke he greueth with aduersitie, leste that they should waxe
843proude, of long prosperitie. And other folke he sufferethe to be
844vexed with harde thynges, that thereby they may confyrme the
845vertues of their mynde, by the vse and exercyse of pacience.
846Some folke doo feare more then they ought to feare, ye thing that
847they maye well suffer. And other dispisethe more then they
848oughte, the thyng that they cannot suffer, and god ledethe them
849into experience of them selfe, that is to saye: makethe them to
850knowe themselfe by aduersities. And manye haue optayned a
851worshypfull fame of thys worlde by the meanes of a glorious
852deth. And some that coulde not be ouercome by ponishment,
853haue shewed example vnto other, that vertue cannot be ouercome
854by aduersitie. And there EDITION: therc is no dout but that all these thynges
855be done ryghtfully, and ordynately, for the goodnes of them, for
856whome they seme to happen. For certes where as sometyme
857aduersities, and otherwhiles thinges desired, doo happen vnto
858wycked folke, noo man meruayleth therat, but iudgeth that it
859comethe of the causes thereof, that is to saye, for theyr
860wyckednes. Lykewyse of the ponyshmentes that happen vnto
861wycked folke no man meruaylethe, for all men doo thynke that
862they haue well deserued the same, and that theyr ponyshmentes
863doth aswell feare other from wyckednes, as causeth them to
864amend that be ponyshed. And the prosperitie that happen
865vnto wycked folke in worldly goodes sheweth a great argument
866and proufe vnto good folke, what they ought to iudge of such

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867prosperitie whych men doo se often tyme serue y wycked folke.
868In whych thing I thynke also the same to be ordeyned by god,
869that some mans nature is perchaunce so ouerturnyng and importunate
870vnto wyckednes, that the pouertie of his houshold may
871rather prouoke hym to stele, whose pouertie that goodnes of god
872cureth and releueth, wyth the medycyne or remedy of mony, and
873ryches. And another man perceyuing his owne conscience
874corrupt with wickednes, and consyderynge wyth hym selfe his
875prosperitie and welth, ferethe leste perchaunce the losse of the
876same prosperitie whiche is pleasaunt vnto hym, should turne
877hym to sorowe and heuines, and therfore he wyl chaunge his
878euyll maners and conditions, and forsake his wyckednes, for fear
879to lose hys prosperitie and riches. Prosperitie and ryches vnworthelye
880gotten hathe ouer throwen other into iust destruction
881accordelye. Some be permytted to haue power to ponysh, for
882that it shuld be an occasion of continuaunce of exercyse in vertue
883to good folke, and a ponyshment to the wycked folke. For as
884there is no concorde or argumente betwene good folke and
885wycked folke, euen so the wycked folke cannot agre emongest
886them selfe. And why not?
887    For all wycked folke do vary of them selfe by theyr wyckednes,
888that rendith their conscience, and doo often tymes suche thynges,
889that when they haue done, they themself do iudge that they
890oughte not to haue bene done. For whyche cause that hye
891prouydence of god, hath often shewed a gret myracle so that
892wycked folke, hath made wycked folke good folke. For when
893that some wycked folke do se that they suffer wronges of the
894wicked, they being moued with enuy and hatred of theyr
895wronges and hurtes, haue returnyd vnto the fruyte of vertue,
896that is to sai vnto goodnes, when they do studye to be vnlyke
897vnto the wicked whom they haue hated. Truely it is onely the
898power of god (to whome also euyll thyngs be good) when he in
899vsynge of those euyles, choseth oute theffecte of some goodnes,
900that is to say, when god turneth euyll to good. For order
901bindeth together all thynges, soo that what thyng departeth from
902the reson and order appointed to the wycked, the same thing
903must nedes fall into some other order, that is to saye: of the
904good, soo that nothinge be lefte to folyshnes, or oute of order in
905the kyngdome of gods prouidence or ordynaunce. The strong
906god hath done al thyngs in the world, when he sawe and behelde

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907before all worldes. And certes it is not lawfull for men eyther
908to comprehende with their wit, or to declare with ther spech all
909the causes of gods workes: It is sufficient only to behold thys
910that the same God, the maker of all natures, ordaynyng all
911things, disposeth them to good. And whyles that he hastethe
912to retayne and kepe the thynges that he hath made into his
913similytude and lykenes, that is to saye: in goodnes, he excludeth
914all wyckednes from the bondes of hys commenaltye of
915thys world, by order of necessite of destenie: whereby it happeth,
916that the euyl that men do thynke to abound in the world if
917thou considerest Gods prouidence, that disposeth all thynges,
918thou shalte perceyue that there is no euyll at all any where. But
919I se well nowe, that thou being of late sore burdned, wc the wayte
920of thys difficulte question, and also weryed with the prolixitie or
921length of my reason, lokest for som swetenes of verses or metyr.
922Therfore take thys drafte, whereby when thou arte refreshed,
923and stronger, thou mayst ascende into hier questions.